The Supreme Court's Public and the Public's Supreme Court
G. Edward White
THIS essay has two related themes, which will be considered in inverse order from their appearance in its title. The first is the problem of making the Supreme Court of the United States and its justices accessible and understandable to the public at large. The second is the problem of ascertaining the proper audience to which Supreme Court decisions should be directed. Both themes are suggested by the recent publication of Richard Kluger's important book, Simple Justice (Knopf, $15.95), a history of the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, outlawing racial segregation in the public schools.
Brown's impact, Kluger rightly senses, was not confined to schools, nor even to race; it reaffirmed and gave concrete meaning to "the inherent equality of mankind." After the unanimous dictates of the Court in Brown were pronounced, one could argue, it did not matter what Americans thought about race relations and racial superiority and inferiority; they had, in their public lives at any rate, to act as if human beings really were created equal. Over time, so runs the argument, thinking one way and acting another becomes a strain, and finally one shapes thoughts to actions. All people become equal because the law, personified by the Supreme Court, says they must be so regarded. Conformity to law finally becomes conformity to a different way of thinking,
But the Supreme Court, Kluger shows, was acutely aware of the controversial nature of racial segregation, anxious to avoid offending large segments of the public with its decision, and as concerned with the immediate practical consequences of a holding invalidating segregated public schools as it was

