Historical Reflections on the Dangers Ahead
Sterling J. Kernek
The Reagan Administration as well as many of its critics have popularized the notion that we live in an unusually dangerous decade. The former focuses on the ominous shadow of the Soviet Union's military power and Moscow's expansionist policies. Critics among the "peace" movements have concentrated on the specter of nuclear war. A survey of diplomatic history leads to the conclusion that some of these fears are ill-founded. This is not to deny the horrible potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons. If we analyzed the danger we face simply by speculating on the potential damage of nuclear war, we would have to conclude that we face unprecedented peril. Yet, from other important perspectives, the current decade does not seem unusually hazardous. Indeed, a major war in our era is very unlikely. That is an important sense in which we are comparatively safe. Moreover, an adverse shift in the balance of power—one that would imperil our interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union—is also unlikely. The United States is in a favorable position to hold its own in that contest. We may have more to fear from economic competition with certain allies. (Japan has recently done more damage to this country than has Russia—ask Detroit.) The Soviet threat is real, but it should not be exaggerated. The Reagan administration's extravagant rhetoric obscures important aspects of the Soviet Union's posture which actually suit the interests of the United States quite well.
Although Reagan probably reaped political benefits during the 1980 election campaign by sounding the alarm about a Soviet threat, he has been forced to realize that hard-line rhetoric can be counterproductive. The need to counter "peace" movements and the pressure to compromise with opponents in Congress have compelled the administration to modify its tough stance, although the basic anti-Soviet inclination remains. Unfortunately, the administration has been slow to develop an effective, coherent, overall policy toward the Soviet Union. The White House apparently also lacks the kind of historical insights that might influence such a policy. In any case, the lessons of history which President Reagan occasionally cites in his speeches do not reveal a well-considered analysis of the past.
