The growing synthesis of Cold War literature suggests that the origins of the East-West crisis were far more complex than generally believed. Both the orthodox version, which stresses Soviet aggrandizement, and the revisionist, with its emphasis on American economic imperialism, frequently overlook the crucial role played by the leaders of East and West in establishing the political atmosphere in which Cold War diplomacy took place. And that atmosphere, as the current Reagan-Gorbachev thaw suggests, usually dictated the pace and direction of the crucial events in postwar Europe.

The 1948—49 division of Germany is a good example. Often cited as the proximate cause of the Cold War, the fact is that throughout 1945 and 1946, when relations between Washington and Moscow progressively deteriorated, cooperation between the U.S. military government in Germany and its Russian counterpart remained remarkably cordial. When relations between the occupiers fell apart in 1947, it was not so much because of indigenous German issues but because the international atmosphere compelled it. In fact, General Lucius D. Clay, who was the U.S. military governor in Germany, believed that American policy-makers in Washington were being duped by hard-line British diplomats into taking unwarranted anti-Soviet positions.

George Kennan's celebrated cable from Moscow pertaining to the sources of Soviet conduct (Feb. 22, 1946) is a useful case in point. When Kennan's cable was circulated to American military commanders throughout the world, General Clay was appalled. Its negative tone, he said, simply did not conform to his daily experience in working with the Russians. As Ambassador Robert Murphy (Clay's State Department deputy) informed Washington shortly afterward: