Charles Maechling

Before the Second World War it was customary to lay the blame for the more flagrant mistakes of American foreign policy on the President and the party in power. Until relatively recently, the major foreign policy problems that confronted each Administration were few in number and generally translatable into simple political issues.

On both the political and economic fronts American foreign policy has been on an uneven track of stumbles and reversals. On the political front the stumbles—Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti—have been the most visible but in many ways the most excusable. In each case the United States has been locked into commitments to the United Nations and its allies to consult first and abstain from unilateral action. The problems in Bosnia and Somalia have been just as intractable for the Europeans.

"What are we doing about guerilla warfare?" asked President John F. Kennedy in January 1961, shortly alter he took office. The answer—at that time—not very much.

The first reaction of the educated public to a new volume of political memoirs is one of wariness. Will this be another pièce justicatif — or an example of Establishment iconography aimed at glorifying distinguished pomposity—or both combined, as in the much overrated Stimson memoirs.